If critical minerals are the new oil, Brazil has quietly become one of the world’s most closely watched energy powers, just with more niobium and fewer pipelines. The catch? Its ability to deepen ties with US- and G7-backed miners comes with a very real geopolitical ceiling: China. 

In 2025, China absorbed 29.3 percent of Brazil’s exports (USD 99.9 billion) more than two-and-a-half times the US share of 11.3 percent (USD 37.7 billion). Total bilateral trade between Brazil and China reached USD 171 billion, while Brazil ran a growing USD 7.4 billion deficit with the United States.  

The composition of that relationship makes the dependence even more significant: China accounted for 51.5 percent of Brazil’s extractive exports and 47 percent of agricultural shipments, including USD 34.7 billion in soybeans, USD 20.9 billion in iron ore and USD 20.5 billion in crude oil. These are not marginal flows; they underpin fiscal revenues, support foreign exchange reserves and help anchor broader economic stability. That is why the central strategic question remains highly sensitive: how far will Brazil go in offering preferential access to US-backed players without alienating China/BRICS partners? The answer, increasingly, appears to be: carefully. 

Brazil does have genuine leverage. Few countries can match its mineral portfolio. It accounts for roughly 93 percent of global niobium production, with annual output of around 92,000 tonnes. It also holds around 23 percent of global rare-earth reserves — approximately 21 million tonnes, compared with China’s 44 million — alongside 26 percent of global natural graphite reserves and roughly 5 percent of global lithium reserves. In a world racing to electrify transport, secure battery inputs and strengthen defence supply chains, that portfolio attracts serious attention. 

“Brazil has a tradition of honouring contracts. It’s very difficult to break a contract.”

Founder of Renewables Energy Company, Brazil 

Brazilian regulators are aware of the leverage and are using it with discipline. US-facing mineral deals increasingly come with a defined package: expectations for local processing, vertical integration and stronger ESG compliance, overseen through the National Mineral Policy Council and the PNM-2050 mining strategy. A senior executive at a leading Brazil-based energy logistics firm also noted that “there might be a slight shift to be stricter … on licensing.” That is particularly relevant in the Amazon frontier, where environmental scrutiny remains politically charged, versus lower-carbon industrial clusters such as Minas Gerais, where infrastructure and grid access are more established. 

For foreign investors, the legal framework is more pragmatic. “If you are a foreign company registered in Brazil, you are considered a Brazilian company with foreign shareholders,” explained a founder of a renewable energy company. Contract enforcement is also viewed as relatively stable, continuing, “Brazil has a tradition of honouring contracts. It’s very difficult to break a contract.” That predictability matters for mining groups investing across long project cycles measured in decades rather than quarters. 

There are boundaries, however. Ownership of strategic assets remains politically sensitive. The renewable energy company founder bluntly exclaimed, “It’s unconstitutional in Brazil for foreigners owning land … the subsoil belongs to the Union.” For global miners, the implication is clear: access is available, but sovereignty is not negotiable. 

“It’s unconstitutional in Brazil for foreigners owning land … the subsoil belongs to the Union.”

Founder of Renewables Energy Company, Brazil 

That balance shapes Brazil’s positioning in the broader China-plus-one conversation. For manufacturers in autos, batteries, aerospace and defence, Brazil increasingly looks attractive. Total trade flows reached roughly USD 629 billion in 2025, with China supplying 25–27 percent of imports (USD 70.9 billion) and the US about 16 percent (USD 45.1 billion), concentrated in high-value industrial inputs and chemicals. Brazil can therefore reduce concentration risk at the margin. 

The emerging structure is unlikely to replace dependence with independence. More realistically, supply chains are reconfiguring around two major poles — US/G7 and China/BRICS — with Brazil operating as the swing node between them. An industry expert explained, “Brazil should not become ‘the alternative’ for one bloc. I prefer that Brazil is an alternative for everybody.” Positioning as a neutral supplier broadens optionality. The expert stated, “Brazil is becoming a kind of safe haven, but it’s very dangerous to put yourself as a safe haven.” 

Domestic politics add another variable. Investor confidence remains supported by production momentum and as noted by the executive, “Over 50 percent [of future production growth] is going to come from non-Petrobras,” but long-term capital allocation still hinges on political continuity and external diplomacy. Concerns remain around volatility and foreign policy posture, reflected in one candid remark, “I’m worried about Bolsonaro because his group is not prepared for this interconnected world.” 

The takeaway is that Brazil is neither a clean substitute for China nor a straightforward Western-aligned supply-chain answer. It is more valuable, and more complicated, than that. It offers scale, deep critical mineral reserves and credible legal protections, while maintaining substantial commercial ties across competing blocs. 

In global supply chains, that may be the most powerful position of all. Everyone wants access. Nobody gets exclusivity. And in today’s market, that is a very Brazilian kind of leverage.