For much of its modern history, Costa Rica has enjoyed a reputation as Central America’s standout democracy; peaceful, institutionally stable and notably free of the large‑scale violence afflicting its neighbours. Its abolition of the military in 1948 became a national touchstone, reinforcing the view of a society built on civic norms rather than coercive force. Yet the past decade has strained these assumptions.  

The intensity of the country’s security crisis is reflected most clearly in homicide trends. According to official Judicial Investigation Department (Organismo de Investigación Judicial, “OIJ”) figures, Costa Rica recorded 904 homicides in 2023, followed by 872 in 2024 and 865 in 2025 — a marginal year‑to‑year decline but still dramatically higher than the country’s historical baseline. The country’s shift from a drug‑transit corridor to a drug‑consumption and distribution market explains much of this stagnation. As a member of the US state department of criminality noted, “Organised crime is focused on drugs. This country used to be a transit point, but now the model has changed.” Continuing, “These drugs are sold on the domestic market, and much of the drug supply later goes to Mexico and Europe, all leaving from the port of Limón.”  

Criminal activity concentrates in a few territorial clusters, commented the US state department member, “San José city centre, Limón province … and Puntarenas province,” but the impacts reach nationally. Broader regional forces compound the problem as a former regional director of the public forces in Puntarenas observed, “Violence and crime have been on the rise in Costa Rica; however, this is largely due to issues linked to drug trafficking, a scourge affecting most countries in the region and continuing to grow.”  

“Violence and crime have been on the rise in Costa Rica; however, this is largely due to issues linked to drug trafficking, a scourge affecting most countries in the region and continuing to grow.”

Former regional director of the public forces, Puntarenas

Yet even as criminal networks have grown more sophisticated, the state’s institutional capacity has not kept pace. In high‑tourism areas such as Cóbano and Santa Teresa, where criminal activity is lower, security forces face resource constraints. “Since 2025, the Public Force and a Tourist Police unit have operated in Cóbano and Santa Teresa. However, due to budget constraints, they work with limited resources, which makes effective coverage difficult given the size of the area,” remarked the former director general of a security and crime risk company.  

“...due to budget constraints, they [the Public Force and a Tourist Police unit] work with limited resources, which makes effective coverage difficult...”

Former director general of a security and crime risk company

This convergence of rising criminal power, legal obsolescence and institutional constraints defined the political climate under President Rodrigo Chaves, whose confrontational style polarised the country but resonated with voters who saw him as one of the few leaders willing to confront entrenched criminal networks. His handpicked successor, Laura Fernández, built her campaign around an explicit promise of continuity, and escalation. 

Fernández brings technocratic experience from her roles as minister of national planning, minister of the presidency and chief of staff. Her February 2026 first‑round victory — avoiding a runoff with roughly half the national vote — signals strong public support for a harder security line. While the final legislative count is still being certified, her party is expected to hold about 30 seats in the 57‑member Assembly, giving her significantly more legislative manoeuvrability than her predecessor, though still short of a constitutional‑reform majority. 

Fernández has emphasised that the coming changes will be “deep and irreversible.” She has pledged a more assertive stance against organised crime, proposing measures such as states of exception in gang‑dominated zones, expanded authority for security forces and completion of a high‑security prison modelled on El Salvador’s facilities. She has also proposed strengthening cooperation with US agencies, particularly on drug‑interdiction initiatives. Still, Fernández insists her government will uphold democratic norms and maintain a balance between robust enforcement and legal safeguards. 

For multinational’s assessing Costa Rica’s trajectory, this moment represents both risk and opportunity. Rising insecurity affects investment decisions, operational costs, logistics, tourism flows and workforce stability. Yet a government with a clear mandate — and a sharpened focus on modernising outdated legal frameworks — could provide the stability that domestic and foreign stakeholders desperately seek. 

Whether Costa Rica’s President‑elect Laura Fernández can deliver lasting, rights‑respecting security improvements will shape not only her administration but the country’s economic and political landscape for years to come.